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RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH IN
NORTH CAROLINA
ROBERT

G. BYRDt

Despite many decisions on the recovery of damagesfor
mental anguish, the North Carolina courts have failed to develop a logical rule structurefor determining when recovery is
allowable. Thus, the cases are resolved on an adhoc basis,producing much uncertainty in the area. ProfessorByrd, after an
exhaustive study of the North Carolinacases, ident~qes several
distinctpatterns in these decisions and discussespossiblefuture
development within thisframework Professor Byrd warns that
to overlook these patterns in favor of a continued ad hoc approachjeopardizes logical development of the law of recovery
for mental and emotional harm.
I.

BACKGROUND AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT

Although intentional or negligent conduct may cause mental or
emotional harm as readily as it causes physical injury, recovery in tort
for such harm has met substantially greater resistance from the courts.
This resistance has been most evident in relation to claims for mental
anguish standing alone; it has also appeared, however, in cases in

which other interests of the claimant have been invaded and mental or
emotional disturbance is only an element of damage for which recovery
is sought.
A number of factors have contributed to the reluctance of courts to
allow recovery for mental anguish.' Because the subjective nature of
the injury makes it easy to feign and difficult to disprove, a fear of
fraudulent claims has existed.2 The potential for much of normal activity to cause mental disturbance, and thus to give rise to damage
claims,3 and the difficulty of drawing boundary lines between trivial
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.S. 1953 and J.D. 1956,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. For a discussion of these factors, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 5051 and 327-28 (4th ed. 1971).
2. See, e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941).
3. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958). The Bosley court's holding that a
direct impact or physical injury was a prerequisite to recovery was later overruled. Niederman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
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and meritorious claims" have been major concerns. Doubts about the
fairness of imposing liability for unusual consequences of more obviously unacceptable conduct5 and distrust of the proof offered to establish the casual relationship between the wrongdoer's conduct and the
injury' have been expressed more in connection with mental anguish
claims than those for other types of harm and have contributed to the
reluctance to sustain them.
The importance of these factors does not seem to depend as much

upon their use to test the sufficiency of the facts of an individual case as
upon the assumption that they reflect broadly the state of affairs that
exists and, therefore, the problems that must ultimately be faced in determining if recovery for mental anguish is to be upheld. Further, the

tendency has been to urge these factors en masse,7 and in some cases an
even more indiscriminate approach is taken by confronting the issue in
terms of a "mental anguish doctrine." 8
Many of these reasons in opposition to recovery for mental
anguish are now rejected by courts, and their use as broadside abstractions has particularly been condemned. 9 Generally, this development
has opened the door to recovery for mental anguish in negligence when

direct or resulting physical injury occurs' 0 and in intentional tort for
outrageous conduct that risks and in fact causes severe mental distress." Except in cases of intentional infliction of mental anguish, however, recovery for mental or emotional distress is limited by the
physical injury threshold,' 2 and the existence of this requirement un-

doubtedly reflects some of the earlier concerns about recovery for
mental anguish in general. _
4. E.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969).
5. E.g.; Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
6. See, e.g., Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). On this issue the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
Nothing [herein] is intended to mean that where the evidence in a particular case as
to the emotional disturbance or the resulting illness is inadequate, unreliable, or otherwise so unsatisfactory that it does not sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof, . . . the
court may not refuse, as a matter of administrative policy, to permit the actor to be held
liable. ... This is true particularly where the evidence consists entirely of the plaintiffs
own subjective testimony, uncorroborated by other witnesses or by the external facts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436, Comment g, at 460 (1965).
7. See, eg., Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
8. E.g., Chappell v. Ellis, 123 N.C. 259, 31 S.E. 709 (1898).
9. E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941).
10. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 330-33.
11. Id. at 55-60.
12. E.g., Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 3d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970) (no physical injury;
recovery denied).
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Surprisingly, very little discussion of the reasons other courts have
given for denial of claims for mental and emotional harm appears in
the North Carolina decisions. The difficulty of measuring damages for
mental anguish claims has been raised in a number of cases but has
been consistently rejected as a basis for denial of recovery. 13 The idea
that there may be some limitation on the right to recover for mental
anguish is also reflected in the North Carolina Supreme Court's frequent reiteration in dicta14 of the statement that fright alone is not compensable. 15 Finally, the court's concern about both the number and
nature of suits that could arise from mental anguish claims has been
expressly stated in a number of cases and is evident in limitations imposed upon the right to recover in other cases. 1 6 As a result, no examination has been made of the reasons for limiting recovery for mental
anguish to instances in which physical injury has resulted.
Neither a review of the historical development of the law in North

Carolina relating to recovery for emotional distress nor a look at its
current status reveals a completely logical rule structure. A number of

early cases seem to make little distinction between mental anguish and
other types of harm caused by tortious conduct, and both their holdings

and rationales seem to recognize broadly a right to recover.' 7 Although
later developments probably limit their authority, for a period of time
13. Harrison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 143 N.C. 147, 151, 55 S.E. 435, 436 (1906) (concurring opinion); Cashion v. Western Union TeL Co., 124 N.C. 459, 32 S.E. 746 (1899); Young v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890).
14. In Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 536, 42 S.E. 983 (1902) the court, in allowing
recovery, found consequential physical injury and reserved decision on the question whether
fright without physical injury would be compensable. Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 55
S.E. 778 (1906), a case in which recovery was also based upon consequential physical injury,
advanced in dictum the proposition that fright alone was not compensable. The dictum was repeated in subsequent cases: Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 73 S.E. 211 (1918); Kirby v. Jules
Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936); Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Prods. Corp.,
212 N.C. 211, 193 S.E. 31 (1937).
15. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979) (resulting physical injury
alleged); Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967) (resulting physical
injury); Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965) (resulting physical injury);
Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960) (recovery denied, apparently on proximate cause rationale); Alltop v. J.C. Penney Co., 10 N.C. App. 692, 179 S.E.2d 885 (recovery
denied), cert. denied, 279 N.C. 348, 186 S.E.2d 176 (1971).
16. See, eg., text accompanying notes 79 & 80 infra.
17. Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 162 N.C. 333, 337, 78 S.E. 507, 508 (1913)
(negligent termination of telephone service; "defendant was guilty of a tort, and is liable for all
damages flowing naturally and proximately from the wrongful act"); Carmichael v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E. 619 (1911) (negligent termination of telephone service; emotional harm as much an element of compensatory damages as other harm); Bowers v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 135 N.C. 504, 505, 47 S.E. 597, 597 (1904) (negligent delivery of telegram:
"Mental anguish is as real as physical, and recovery in proper cases is allowed of just compensation, when anguish, whether physical or mental, is caused by the negligence, default, or wrongful
act of another.").

438

NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 58

these holdings were interpreted more broadly to permit recovery in different types of cases from those in which they were established. 18 For
example, in Young v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 9 the initial case in
which the question of recovery for mental anguish for negligent transmission of telegraph messages was presented, the court, in recognizing
a cause of action, relied upon a variety of earlier cases that had allowed
compensation for mental anguish."0 This analysis led the court to conclude:
It seems to us that this action is in reality in the nature of tort for the
negligence, and that, as is usually the case for such actions, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, in addition to nominal damages, compensation for the actual damage done him, and that mental anguish is
actual damage.2 '
Although attempts to limit the authority of these decisions were
rejected in a number of cases, 22 their broader significance gradually
diminished, and today they are important primarily in the context of
the narrow fact situations before the court when they were decided.
The cases involving negligent transmission of telegraph messages were
the most notable ones in this group both because of the large number
that were decided and because they squarely presented the question of
recognition of a cause of action in negligence for mental anguish
alone.' This view of the right to recovery for mental anguish was not
limited, however, to the telegraph cases, and a wide range of cases, in18. For example, Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628,47 S.E. 811 (1904), which held in a defama-

tion case that mental suffering constituted compensatory damage, was subsequently relied upon in
upholding recovery for mental anguish for negligent transmission of a telegram, Green v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 136 N.C. 489, 49 S.E. 165 (1904); negligent delay in delivering a casket, Byers v.
Southern Express Co., 165 N.C. 542, 81 S.E. 741 (1914), rev'd on o/her grounds, 240 U.S. 612
(1916); wrongful ejectment from a train, Ammons v. Southern R.R., 140 N.C. 196, 199, 52 $.E.
731, 732 (1905) (concurring opinion) and negligent termination of telephone service, Carmichael
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E. 619 (1911).
19. 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890).
20. Id.
Damages for injury to the feelings, such as mental anguish or humiliation, are given,
though there may be no physical injury, in many cases. They are allowed where a party
is wrongfully put off a train... ; in actions for breach of promise ofmarriage; in actions
for slander and libel... ; in actions for malicious arrest and prosecution... ; in actions
for false imprisonment... ; and for seduction, and in other cases. . .. We see, there-

fore, no reason why the doctrine of compensation for injury to feelings should not embrace a case like the one before us.
Id. at 384, 11 S.E. at 1048 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 385, 11 S.E. at 1048.
22. Alexander v. Western Union Tel. Co., 158 N.C. 473, 74 S.E. 449 (1912); Green v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 136 N.C. 489, 49 S.E. 165 (1904); Cashion v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 N.C.
459, 32 S.E. 746 (1899); Sherill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 116 N.C. 655, 21 S.E. 429 (1895).
23. See text accompanying notes 103-113 infra.
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cluding actions for negligent termination of telephone services, 24 negligent discharge of railway passengers,25 seduction, 26 alienation of
affections 27 and defamation, 8 contributed to its development.
Other cases in the same time period reflect substantially less willingness to view mental anguish as damage to be compensated routinely
on the same basis as physical injury or other harm and introduce the
requirement of contemporaneous or resulting physical harm as a prerequisite to recovery. 29 The significance of these cases was unclear for
a number of reasons. Initially, this view was expressed in only a few
cases. No effort was made in them to distinguish or limit the cases
allowing recovery for mental anguish alone; in fact no reference of any
kind was made to those cases. Finally, as noted previously, even in the
cases in which the court imposed the physical injury threshold, a basis
for recovery was. generally found, and the statement of the court in
these cases that fright alone was not compensable was not crucial to the
decisions."
A third and entirely separate line of cases evolved from the
supreme court's recognition of a civil action for forcible trespass, 31 a
common law and statutory crime.32 The essence of this "tort" seems to
be the aggravated nature of the defendant's conduct,33 and apparently
neither an actual trespass to land nor an assault is essential to its existence. Thus, in Saunders v. Gilbert,34 a large, hostile crowd, after following plaintiff from church to his home, stood in the street in front of
24. See text accompanying note 119 infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 114-118 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 77-81 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 84-94 infra.
28. See note 18 supra. For a further discussion of cases, see notes 95-102 and accompanying
text infra.
29. See note 14 supra.
30. Id.
31. E.g., Martin v. Spencer, 221 N.C. 28, 18 S.E.2d 703 (1942); Freeman v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E. 63 (1933); Beasley v. Byrum, 163 N.C. 3, 79 S.E. 270
(1913).
32. See Sharpe, Forcible Trespass to Real Property, 39 N.C.L. Rev. 121 (1961).
33. In Anthony v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934) (recovery denied), for example, the court stated:
[The act complained of must have been with a strong hand, 'manufori;,' and this implies
the exercise of greater force than is expressed by the words 'vi et armis.' Rudeness of
language, mere words, or even a slight demonstration of force against which ordinary
firmness is a sufficient protection will not constitute the offense.
Id. at 11, 173 S.E. at 8; see Kaylor v. Sain, 207 N.C. 312, 312-13, 176 S.E. 560, 561 (1934) (quoting
Anthony).
34. 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911).
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his house and made threats against him. The court, upholding the sufficiency of the evidence to state a cause of action, said:
It can make no difference that this large multitude of people did not
actually enter upon the premises of the plaintiff or go within their
curtilage. We have held that the gathering of a large number of per-

sons on the public road in front of a man's house, or the use of violent, abusive or insulting language in a public or private road, or in
the street of a city, in the presence and hearing of the owner of adjoining property, constitutes a forcible trespass.35
If, as appears to be the case, the court recognized a defendant's "show
of force" as a substantive basis of recovery, it resembles the tort of assault, and a plaintiffs mental and emotional security would be the principal interest safeguarded by it. Although in these cases physical injury
appears to have resulted from the emotional distress, proof of such injury should not be necessary if any significance is to be attached to the
court's characterization of the defendant's conduct as a forcible tres36
pass.
The forcible trespass cases set the stage for Kirby v. Jules Chain
Stores Corp.,3 7 a case that has become a watershed between earlier
cases and the law's subsequent development. In Kirby, a bill collector
came to plaintiffs home to request payment on an account she owed.
While sitting in his car, which was parked about fifteen feet away from
plaintiff, he "hollered" at plaintiff. "'By G-, you are like all the rest
of the damn deadbeats. You wouldn't pay when you could. .

.

. If

you are so damn low you won't pay, I guess when I get the sheriff and
bring him down here you will pay then.' ,,3s He repeated three or four
times his threat to get the sheriff and have plaintiff arrested and then
drove away. Plaintiff became frightened and suffered a miscarriage.
Neither plaintiffs complaint nor the judge's charge identified a
specific substantive tort theory for recovery. The issue submitted to the
jury was whether the defendant had unlawfully and wrongfully frightened plaintiff and thereby caused her miscarriage.3 9 The jury found for
plaintiff, and on appeal plaintiffs attorney relied in part upon earlier
forcible trespass cases to argue that the judgment should be affirmed. 40
Two cases, decided shortly before Kfirby arose, had held that proof of
35. Id. at 474, 72 S.E. at 614.
36. Under this view of the cases, a clear parallel exists between these cases and the tort of
intentional infliction of mental anguish. See text accompanying notes 164-182 infra.
37. 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936).

38. Id. at 809, 188 S.E. at 625.
39. Record at 57.

40. Brief for Plaintiff at 5-8.
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facts somewhat similar to those in Kirby failed to make out a case in
forcible trespass. 4 1
The court, without deciding whether the facts were sufficient to
constitute a forcible trespass, upheld the verdict and judgment. By
eliminating the forcible trespass theory, it confronted directly the issue
whether plaintiffs claim could be based upon conduct, not otherwise
actionable, that threatened forseeable mental or emotional harm. A
cause of action based upon such conduct was recognized:
It is true, the basis of the action in most of the cases has been forcible
trespass, and it is contended that in the case at bar no forcible trespass has been shown, hence no liability exists. Without conceding
the correctness of the syllogism as applied to the instant case, it is
observed that much of the confusion on the subject seems to have
come from worshipping at the shrine of words and formulas, rather
than applying correct principles to the facts in hand .... It is no
doubt correct to say that fright alone is not actionable, . . . but it is
faulty pathology to assume that nervous disorders of serious proportions may not flow from fear or fright ...
If it be actionable willfully or negligently to frighten a team by
blowing a whistle,. . . or by beating a drum,. . . thereby causing a
run-away and consequent damage, it is not perceived upon what logthe present action can be dismissed as in case
ical basis of
42distinction
of nonsuit.
In Kirby, the court stated that "[t]he gravamen of plaintiff's cause
of action is trespass to the person." 43 In a later case in which plaintiff
had been frightened by defendant's conduct and suffered a miscarriage,
plaintiff, relying on the above statement, based her action on.an allegation of "trespass to person."' On the authority of Kirby, the supreme
court upheld plaintiff's recovery. In doing so, the court observed:
'There is evidence of a forcible trespass and also trespass to the person
of the plaintiff."4 5
Finally, in 1967 in Crews v. ProvidentFinance Corp.,46 a case involving facts similar to those in Kirby, the supreme court followed
Kirby and referred to the provisions of section 436 of the Restatement
(Second)of Torts. This section recognizes a cause of action when de41.
Union,
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Kaylor v. Sain, 207 N.C. 312, 176 S.E. 560 (1934); Anthony v. Teachers' Protective
206 N.C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934).
210 N.C. at 812-13, 188 S.E. at 627-28.
Id. at 810, 188 S.E. at 626.
Martin v. Spence, 221 N.C. 28, 30, 18 S.E.2d 703, 703 (1942).
Id. at 30, 18 S.E.2d at 703.
271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967).
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fendant's negligence causes fright or other emotional disturbance that
"'the actor should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm,"' although that harm results solely through the internal operation of the fright or other emotional disturbance.
The above developments created uncertainty about the North CarThe supreme court
olina law relating to recovery for mental anguish.
48
way:
this
in
situation
the
itself has summarized
The foregoing resume demonstrates the lack of harmony in the decisions of the courts in this area of the law. It appears that cases have
usually been decided strictly upon the factual situations presented.
Indeed, it is a field of law in which there is a great difficulty in adhering to any fixed set of principles. It is clear that our Court has decided cases in this category strictly upon the facts as presented
without adopting inflexible rules.4 9

Some of the uncertainty that has existed may be traceable to the
supreme court's early struggle to decide if claims for mental anguish
should be treated any differently from other claims. This struggle may
have resulted in parallel lines of decisions on the issue and forestalled
any attempt to reconcile or limit them. Additional uncertainty has
been created by the court's utilization of less traditional theories, such
as forcible trespass and trespass to the person, to allow recovery in
some cases. There is a tendency in the decisions to treat all mental
anguish claims alike, and as a result distinctions are seldom made between intentional conduct and negligence, or between the determination of the extent of liability and the decision if a cause of action exists
at all. A problem in interpreting these cases arises because it is not
possible to determine from the decisions whether these possible distinctions were considered and rejected or simply not addressed by the
court. While the idea that fright alone is not compensable seems to
have become well embedded in North Carolina law, the cases have explored the problem very little beyond this level.
Although it is true that no single rule has evolved to control the
award of damages for mental and emotional harm and that to some
extent the right to recover hinges upon the circumstances out of which
the harm arose, some fairly distinct patterns have emerged in the cases.
This Article will analyze the North Carolina cases in this area, undertake to identify the patterns that exist and explore possibilities for
change or further development in this general framework.
47. Id. at 689, 157 S.E.2d at 386 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 436 (1965)).

48. Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
49. Id. at 506, 112 S.E.2d at 53-54.
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WHEN A SEPARATE TORT EXISTS: THE PARASITIC DAMAGES

RULE

There are a number of torts in which mental or emotional harm is
the interest or one of the primary interests protected by the cause of
action. Actions for assault, battery and false imprisonment, because of
the dignitary interest involved, are of this type.5 0 Defamation,5 ' malicious prosecution, 52 seduction 3 and alienation of affections5 4 also
should probably be placed in this category. Damages for mental
anguish and emotional distress, at least to the eitent that they result
immediately from the defendant's conduct, are universally allowed in
these actions.
The observation is frequently made that damages for mental suffering may be recovered parasitic to a cause of action in tort that exists
independently of the mental harm. Yet, neither the rule nor the extent
of its application is clearly stated in the cases.5 The rule is usually
applied in cases in which an invasion of the person, reputation or other
dignitary interest has occurred. 6 In these cases recovery extends to any
mental harm reasonably related to the defendant's conduct.5 7 Thus, in
an assault action compensation is awarded not only for apprehension
of immediate harmful or offensive contact but also for other mental
disturbance proximately caused by it. An important application of the
rule is to situations in which defendant's conduct has caused a direct
physical injury; in these cases recovery for mental and emotional harm
has been readily allowed. 8
The greatest uncertainty in North Carolina and elsewhere in relation to application of the parasitic damages rule arises in connection
with actions that primarily involve invasions of property interests. In
many of the cases upholding recovery in such actions from other juris50. Trogdon v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540,90 S.E. 583 (1916) (assault); Hodges v. Hall, 172 N.C. 29,
89 S.E. 802 (1911) (assault and battery); Bedsole v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 151 N.C. 152, 65 S.E.

925 (1909) (assault); Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044, 1890 (dictum)
(false imprisonment).

51. For discussion of cases, see text accompanying notes 100-107 infra.
52. Carver v. Lyles, 262 N.C. 345, 352-53, 137 S.E.2d 139, 145 (1964); Kelly v. Durham Traction Co., 132 N.C. 369, 43 S.E. 923 (1903).
53. For discussion of cases, see text accompanying notes 80-84 infra.
54. For discussion of cases, see text accompanying notes 88-99 infra.
55. See cases cited notes 50-54 supra.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1965) provides for compensation for emotional distress in a separate cause of action. Such damages "are most frequently given in actions
for bodily contact and harm to reputation .... but they may also be given in actions for other
types of harm." Id. Comment a, at 456.
57. See cases cited notes 50-54 supra.
58. For discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 128-43 infra.
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dictions, the defendant's conduct has involved a significant element of
abuse, threat or intimidation. Courts have characterized this conduct
as wilfull or malicious and on that basis have allowed recovery for
emotional distress. 9 When an element of aggravation is not present,
broad0 generalizations about the law in other jurisdictions become diffi6
cult.
Two of the North Carolina cases on this issue require detailed consideration. In the first case, Chappell v. Ellis,61 plaintiff sought to recover for mental suffering incident to the wrongful seizure and
detention of personal property. The supreme court, apparently without
recognizing the distinction between the case before it and cases in
which no cause of action existed apart from the mental suffering, denied damages for mental suffering on the ground that the "mental
anguish" doctrine "has never been applied to a case like that at bar."62
The case appears to be an isolated one, and, in the only subsequent
reference to its holding, the supreme court, in refusing to rely on Chappell, seemed to limit its significance.63
The second case, Matthews v. Forrest," upheld recovery for
mental suffering, without accompanying or consequential physical injury, caused by defendant's trespass upon and removal of flowers from
the grave of plaintiffs wife. The court held that "compensatory damages may be awarded to a plaintiff for mental suffering actually endured by him as the natural and probable consequence of a trespass to
his burial lot."' 65 Some uncertainty, however, has resulted from a general disclaimer that was made by the Matthews court:
The question whether mental suffering unaccompanied by any cor-

poral injury to the plaintiff constitutes a proper element of damages
in an action for trespass to realty has sharply divided the courts of
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

The cases are collected in Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1070 (1953).
Id.
123 N.C. 259, 31 S.E. 709 (1898).
Id. at 261, 31 S.E. at 711.
Green v. Western Union Tel. Co., 136 N.C. 489, 49 S.E. 165 (1904). The Chappell deci-

sion was apparently based upon a limited view of the fact situations that would permit a finding of
the high degree of suffering required under the mental anguish doctrine. This view is evident in
the following comparison made by the court: "The anguish of a mother bending over the body of
her child, every lock of whose sunny hair is entwined with a heartstring, and kissing the cold lips
that are closed forever, cannot come within the range of comparison with any mental suffering
caused by the loss of a pig." Chappell v. Ellis, 123 N.C. 259, 263, 31 S.E. 709, 710 (1898). The
Green decision upheld a cause of action for the mental suffering of a sixteen-year-old girl who,
because of defendant's negligent delivery of a telegram, was not met by her father upon her arrival
at the train station late at night. In so doing, the court rejected the contention that recovery for
mental suffering should be limited to circumstances involving death or illness.
64. 235 N.C. 281, 69 S.E.2d 553 (1952).
65. Id. at 285, 69 S.E.2d at 556.
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the land. . . We forego entry into the general
debate and confine
6
our decision to the precise problem at hand.1

Damages for a wide range of mental and emotional harm have
been allowed in other actions for trespass to realty.67 In each case the

defendant's actions included conduct likely to cause mental distress,
and in most of the cases that conduct, while not constituting an assault,
was likely to cause the plaintiff concern for his own safety. 68 Recovery
has been allowed, however, for aggravated conduct that posed no personal danger to the plaintiff,69 and the Matthews-case, in which defend-

ant removed flowers from the grave of plaintiffs wife, suggests that
highly offensive conduct accompanying a trespass may be enough for

the application of the parasitic damages rule.
Except when physical injury or illness is caused, it is unclear
whether the parasitic damage rule will be applied in negligence actions.
In two early cases,7 0 defendant's negligence in blasting with explosives
propelled debris through the roof of the house in which plaintiff lived

and caused plaintiff serious fright and emotional distress. In each instance, physical injury resulted from the fright, and recovery was based
upon this fact. The opinions of the supreme court in the two cases,
however, suggest that, had there been no resulting physical injury, recovery for mental anguish would have been denied. Under the facts in

these cases, plaintiff probably could not have maintained a negligence
action for damages to realty,7 1 and for that reason an interpretation of

the courts' dicta as denying parasitic damages for mental anguish in
negligence actions for property damage would be open to serious question.
66. Id.
67. It is held to be the law that, an individual whose rights of person or property are thus
violated is generally entitled to recover damages for. . . inconvenience, injury to feelings, and mental suffering, pain, vexation, anxiety, the sense of wrong, shame, or humiliation. .. ,resulting from an act dictated by a spirit of wilfull injustice, or by a deliberate
intention to vex, degrade, or insult .... Inconvenience, annoyance, or discomfort may
also be considered.
Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 480, 72 S.E. 610, 617 (1911).
68. Beasley v. Byrum, 163 N.C. 3, 79 S.E. 270 (1913) (entered premises armed with a shotgun; shot and killed plaintiff's dog); May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416, 72 S.E. 1059
(1911) (used loud, profane and boisterous language; sang lewd and vulgar songs; yelled at plaintiff
and invaded her house); Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911) (large and threatening crowd; firing gun onto property).
69. Brame v. Clark, 148 N.C. 364, 62 S.E. 418 (1908) (trespass to seduce plaintiff's wife).
70. Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 73 S.E. 211 (1918); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399,
55 S.E. 778 (1906).
71. In each case plaintiff lived on the property with her husband, and, if, as seems likely, he
owned the realty or they owned it in tenancy by the entireties, she would have had no action for
damage to realty. See West v. Aberdeen & Rockfish RL1, 140 N.C. 620, 53 S.E. 477 (1906).
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Damages for mental suffering are apparently also denied in a father's action for loss of services and medical expenses based upon negligent injury to a minor child. 72 Because this type of derivative action
provides little additional assurance of the validity of the mental
anguish claim, these cases do not necessarily suggest a general rejection
of the parasitic damages rule in negligence cases.
In Williamson v. Bennett,73 plaintiff was driving her car when it
was struck by defendant's car. Plaintiff received no immediate physical
injuries but suffered a severe mental disturbance.7 4 Recovery was denied primarily on the ground that the consequences were unusual and
remote.7" Prior to considering these issues the court said:
It is almost the universal opinion that recovery may be had for
mental or emotional disturbance in ordinary negligence cases where,
coincident in time and place with the occurrence producing the
mental stress, some actual physical impact or general physical injury
also resulted directly from the defendant's negligence.... North
Carolina decisions are in accord.7 6

The court's reliance upon a proximate cause rationale to deny recovery
suggests the possibility that the court considered plaintiffs proof sufficient to establish a basis for liability and rejected imposition of liability
only because the particular harm to plaintiff was unforeseeable. If this
view were accepted, one interpretation of the case, in light of the court's
statement set out above, would be that the court regarded the collision

with plaintiffs car to be a "physical impact." A parallel could then be
drawn between this situation, in which the collision may be viewed as
72. 3 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAmILY LAW § 241 at 111-12 (1963).
73. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
74. At the time of the accident, plaintiff feared that she had hit a child on a bicycle. After
pulling to the side of the road, she realized that she had hit another car and was relieved to learn
she had not struck a child. Shortly after the accident, she experienced mental and emotional
difficulties. Psychiatrists testified that the accident triggered her reaction, that it would not have
occurred without the accident, that a prior incident in which her brother-in-law had struck a child
on a bicycle made her more susceptible to the fear that she had done so and that the "noise...
like the noise of a bicycle against the side of a car" was a very important factor in her reaction. Id.
at 500-01, 112 S.E.2d at 49-50.
75. The basic premise of the court's holding was that the plaintiff's neurotic reaction was not
due to the actual events of the accident itself but to an imagined state of affairs that she could
readily have discovered did not exist and, thus, that the consequences were so extraordinary that
defendant should not be held liable for them. Id. at 507-08, 112 S.E.2d at 54-55. The court also
relied for its decision upon the rule denying recovery for mental harm arising from fear for a third
person's safety and possibly upon the plaintiff's contributory negligence in failing to determine
what had actually occurred. Id. at 508, 112 S.E.2d at 55. It is doubtful, however, that either of
these additional theories could stand apart from the court's initial basic premise because the first is
applicable only to the state of affairs imagined by the plaintiff and the second ignores the fact that
plaintiff's neurotic reaction occurred despite her discovery of the actual facts at the first reasonable
opportunity. Neither theory responds to the real issue presented by the case.
76. Id. at 503, 112 S.E.2d at 52.
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an "impact" that opens the way for recovery of mental distress damages, and the parasitic damages rule, in which invasion of pr9perty interests may be given a similar effect. Even if this interpretation of
Williamson were accepted, however, any conclusion that Williamson
represents application of the parasitic damages rule in a negligence action would have to be significantly qualified by recognition that the
"impact" rule might be limited to cases in which a defendant's conduct
risks personal injury to a plaintiff.
Although this interpretation of the case is consistent with the
court's decision, no reason exists to prefer it over other possible interpretations that are equally consistent with the decision. Thus the facts
in the case probably would have supported a finding that a physical
injury had resulted from the mental harm, and the sufficiency of the
proof to establish a basis of liability could have been upheld on that
basis. Liability would have still been denied because of the remoteness
of the harm. Further, the view that the court did not evaluate at all the
sufficiency of the proof to establish a basis of liability would not be an
unreasonable interpretation of the case.
The reasons relied upon by courts to deny recovery are not as cogent when an independent tort exists as when mental harm is the sole
basis of the action. The existence of the separate tort may afford some
guarantee of the genuiness of claims and provide an acceptable barrier
to trivial and uncertain ones, thereby lessening the likelihood of fraudulent and frivolous suits. The value of these assurances can be questioned, but the judgment about their effectiveness must take into
account the position of mental and emotional harm as a proper element
of damage and recognize the exceptional nature of the rule denying
recovery for such harm. Under this reasoning, recovery for mental distress reasonably related to a defendant's conduct would seem to be as
appropriate in a negligence action in which other interests have also
been invaded as in the trespass to realty cases. The only reasonable
basis for distinguishing them would be that greater legal responsibility
should be imposed for intentional conduct.
The parasitic damages rule does not automatically open the way
for compensation for all mental and emotional harm, and the failure of
the supreme court to recognize that fact may be the source of some of
the confusion. The rule simply provides that recovery should not be
denied merely because the harm consists of mental or emotional distress. Issues related to actual causation, liability for unusual consequences of conduct and other problems may well arise in this type of
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case. As in the case of any other harm, liability may be denied for
emotional distress that is remote, unforeseeable or otherwise found not
to be proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. Considering
these problems under an umbrella of "mental anguish," however, seldom provides an effective way to deal with them.
III.

RELATIONAL INTERESTS

Cases involving relational interests pose difficult problems with respect to mental anguish claims and have been troublesome for the
North Carolina courts. The nature of the relationship between two
people may in itself provide convincing proof that a defendant's conduct in causing injury or death to one will cause genuine emotional
distress to the other. Although this result is most obvious in the case of
a husband and wife or a parent and child, there are many other relationships in which genuine emotional distress is not unlikely. The
same potential for mental anguish is present when a defendant's conduct disrupts a plaintiffs relationship with others, as when he publishes
defamatory statements about the plaintiff.
These very facts, however, create the possibility of liability to a
large number of people and undoubtedly in some instances pose the
dilemma of distinguishing trivial harm and serious interference with
emotional security. Under these circumstances the fear of an indefinite
liability is a legitimate one, and the need to impose reasonable limits
upon the extent of a defendant's responsibility clearly exists. Defining
a rule structure for this purpose has proved difficult, and the distinctions that have been made are fairly arbitrary.
These difficulties are apparent in a series of cases dealing with
family relations. In a father's action for seduction of his daughter, the
courts have recognized that loss of services is only a fiction 7" and that
"[t]he action is really for the humiliation, the mental suffering and
'78
anguish inflicted by the seducer, and for punishment to the seducer.
In Snider v. Newell,7 9 the supreme court held that proof of neither the

daughter's actual performance of services nor a loss of future services
was necessary to the action. Yet, the court chose not to abandon the
requirement that a loss of services be alleged in the complaint. The
court's unwillingness to dispense with the allegation of loss of services
77. See, eg., Briggs v.:Evans, 27 N.C. 16 (1884).
78. Willeford v. Bailey, 132 N.C. 402, 404, 43 S.E. 928, 929 (1903).
79. 132 N.C. 614, 44 S.E. 354 (1903).
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was based upon the view that defendant's-liability might otherwise be
extended unreasonably. The court said:
It would not require any considerable foresight to see a large yielding
of suits for seduction brought by collateral relations upon the suggestion of loss sustained in social position, business relations, mortified
sensibilities, etc. We have a striking illustration of this in Young v.
Tel. Co. . . . in which we held that a husband to whom a message
had been sent notifying him of the sickness of his wife could, in an
action for failure to deliver promptly, recover, in addition to nominal
damages, compensation for mental anguish. Since the decision of
that case, we have entertained suits for "compensation for mental
anguish" brought by persons of almost every kind and degree of kinship, and we have good reason for thinking that "the end doth not
yet appear." It is undoubtedly true that, as we come into a clearer
view of social, domestic, and business relations, with their resulting
rights and duties, the courts will guard these relations and protect
them by appropriate remedies. . . In doing so, the principles underlying our jurisprudence must not be violated, or sentimental emotions be made cause of actions; nor must we permit the tenderst and
mostsosacred relations of life to become sources of profit and speculation.
The limitation that denies the father an action for seduction of a
daughter who has reached majority8 ' is patently inconsistent with the
theory of compensating him for humiliation and mental suffering and
is probably to be regarded as a further indication of the court's desire to
restrict this type of action.
Recovery for mental or emotional harm similar to that allowed for
seduction has not been recognized in North Carolina, however, with
respect to other injury or death of a child.8 2 Recovery for the parents'
mental anguish is denied even though a cause of action exists for loss of
the child's services or for expenses incurred because of the injury or
death.s3
Essentially the same issues are presented when a husband or wife
seeks to recover for mental suffering caused by negligently or intentionally inflicted injury or death to the other. A substantial parallel also
exists in regard to the court's treatment of the two relationships. As in
the case of seduction of a minor child, recovery has been allowed for a
80. Id. at 619-20, 44 S.E. at 355-56.
81. Tillotson v. Currin, 176 N.C. 479,97 S.E. 395 (1918); Hood v. Sudderth, 111 N.C. 215, 16

S.E. 397 (1892).
82. Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n v. Neal, 194 N.C. 401, 139 S.E. 841 (1927)
(injury); Croom v. Murphy, 179 N.C. 393, 102 S.E. 706 (1920) (death); Ballinger v. Rader, 153
N.C. 488, 69 S.E. 497 (1910) (death).
83. See 3 R. LnE, supra note 72, § 241 at 111-12.
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in actions for criminal

For mental suffering
conversation and alienation of affections.
by
conduct
other
than that constituting
caused by injury to a spouse
criminal conversation or alienation of affections, 86 however, no recovery is allowed.8 7 Initially, the supreme court, while recognizing a cause

of action in a husband for loss of his wife's services, denied any recovery for mental anguish suffered by him because of her injury.88 Later

cases, however, upheld his right to recover for mental suffering as a
principal element of damage in his action for loss of consortium.89
Subsequent to the passage of the Married Woman's Act, 90 the wife's

right to recover for loss of consortium was approved in Hop v. Dupont.9 ' The court held that a wife could recover for mental anguish
and resulting physical injury caused "'by reason of the sudden and
fearful injury of her husband . . . and by reason of being forced to

look upon him in his horribly multilated condition.' "92 The issue
came before the court again a few years later, but this time the court
characterized the claim as one for mental suffering that was not related
to any other cause of action, overruled the Hpp case, and denied recovery. 93 The circle was completed when, in Helmstetler v. Duke Power
Co ." the court held that the husband's cause of action for loss of con84. Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393, 403, 79 S.E. 872, 876 (1913) (recovery allowed for
"mental suffering, injured feelings, humiliation, shame and mortification . . . and the disgrace
.. . heaped upon him").
85. Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 102 S.E. 769 (1920); Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393,
79 S.E. 872 (1913); Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 170 S.E.2d 104 (1969).
86. Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
87. Craig v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 189 N.C. 137, 126 S.E. 312 (1924).
88. Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 405, 55 S.E. 778, 781 (1906).
89. Bailey v. Long, 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 709 (1916).
90. Act of May 16, 1913, ch. 13, § 1, 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 45 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52-4 (1976)).

91. 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921).
92. Id. at 18, 108 S.E. at 322.
93. Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
94. 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1944).
In Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem. Hosp., Inc., No. 80-104 (N.C. Sup. Ct, 1980), a case
decided after this Article went to press, the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hinnant and
Helmseetter and upheld a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium incident to injury to her
husband caused by defendant's negligence. In this action, recovery for mental anguish as an element of damages was appaarently not alleged and the court did not address the right to recover
such damages. In Hinnant and Helmsteter, denial of recovery for mental anguish was premised
upon refusal to recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium, In earlier cases in which a cause
of action for loss of consortium had been upheld, damages for mental anguish were allowed.
Thus, the effect of Nicholson upon the right of recovery for mental anguish incident to a cause of
action for loss of consortium is unclear.
As a practical matter, no meaningful distinction can likely be made between mental and
emotional harm and .invasion of other interests encompassed by consortium. The court identified
these interests in Nicholson in the following way:
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sortium did not survive the destruction of his common-law right to his
wife's services and that an independent action could not be maintained
by him for mental anguish suffered because of his wife's injury.
The basis on which the supreme court distinguishes, for the purpose of determining a claim for mental distress, cases involving seduction, criminal -conversation and alienation of affections from those
involving other injury or death to a child or spouse is not clear. The
nature of the relationship disrupted by a defendant's conduct does not
necessarily differ significantly in the two situations. Moreover, the suffering experienced by a parent or spouse may be as likely and as great
when a grave injury or death results as when a seduction occurs. Perhaps the basis of this distinction is that in seduction and related torts a
defendant has acted intentionally and with knowledge of the consequences of his conduct to a plaintiff.
Injury to relational interests may also result from conduct that adversely affects the esteem or regard in which a plaintiff is held by
others. Defamation is the principal cause of action for protection of
these relational interests, and damage may include pecuniary loss,
harm to reputation and mental disturbance. Although recovery for
mental and emotional harm has been freely allowed in defamation actions, 95 a distinction is made between publications that are actionable
per se and those, the defamatory meaning of which appears only in
light of extrinsic facts, that are actionable only upon proof of special
damages. Special damages consist only of pecuniary losses, and proof
of mental or emotional harm is inadequate to meet this threshold requirement. 96 One explanation for the view that mental or emotional
harm does not constitute special damage was given in Scott v. Harrison:97 "Perhaps because humiliation and the poignancy of mental dis[W]hile we recognize that consortium is difficult to define, we believe the better view is
that it embraces service, society, companionship, sexual gratification and affection, and
we so hold today. We do so in recognition of the many tangible and intangible benefits
resulting from the loving bond of the marital relationship.
Id., slip op. at 9. Because these interests consist of the significant emotional and mental ties between husband and wife, any attempt to identify other mental or emotional harm that exists apart
from them for which recovery would be denied seems futile.
In addition, the Nicholson court recognized the position stated in the text as the basis for
distinguishing, for the purpose of determining a claim for mental anguish, cases involving seduction, criminal conversation and alienation of affections from those involving other injury or death
to a child or spouse. It rejected that distinction as unsound, however, and upheld an action for
loss of consortium based upon negligence. Id., slip op. at 7.
95. Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882 (1940); Osborn v. Leach, 135
N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904).

96. Scott v. Harrison, 215 N.C. 427, 430-31, 2 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1939).
97. Id. at 427, 2 S.E.2d at 1.
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tress are not easily measured in money values, they have been, at least
in slander cases, considered merely in aggravation of damages." 98
If proof of special damages is required to establish a cause of action and no proof is offered, recovery for mental and emotional harm is
denied. 99 On the other hand, once a cause of action has been established, either by proof that the publication is actionable per se or, apparently, by proof of special damages, recovery may be had for mental
suffering, including humiliation, embarrassment, and hurt feelings, hs
well as for severe mental anguish.' °° The supreme court has held that
mental suffering, as well as other harm, may be presumed from the
publication of a per se defamatory statement and that the jury may be
permitted to award damages even when a plaintiff has offered no proof
of actual harm.10' The presumed damage rule, however, has been restricted, if not overturned, by a recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court holding that the Constitution precludes states from limiting free speech in this way.' 2
Two considerations seem important to the award of damages for
mental suffering in defamation cases. Mental suffering is almost inseparable from the reputational interest with which defamation is identified, and any attempt to exclude it from the cause of action would be
virtually impossible. The other possibility is that the court may view
the award for mental suffering as parasitic damages in a cause of action
that exists independently of the mental disturbance.
IV.
A.

NEGLIGENCE

Telegraph andRelated Cases

The North Carolina Supreme Court at an early time adopted a
liberal view allowing recovery for mental or emotional harm for negligent transmission of telegraph messages.'0 3 Recovery was allowed by
98. Id. at 431, 2 S.E.2d at 3.
99. Scott v. Harrison, 215 N.C. 427, 2 S.E.2d 1 (1939); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Williams v. Rutherford Freight Lines, 10 N.C. App. 384, 179 S.E.2d

319 (1971).
100. Jones v. Brinkley, 174 N.C. 23, 93 S.E. 372 (1917); Barringer v. Deal, 164 N.C. 246, 80
S.E. 161 (1913); Fields v. Bynum, 156 N.C. 413, 72 S.E. 449 (1911).
101. Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882 (1940); Fields v. Bynum, 156
N.C. 413, 72 S.E. 449 (1911); Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904).

102. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). "States may not permit recovery of
presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 349.
103. E.g., Green v. Western Union Tel. Co., 136 N.C. 489,49 S.E. 165 (1904); Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890).
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the sender of the message," ° the person to whom it was sent10 5 or any
other individual who had a beneficial interest in the message of which
the company knew or should have known.'0 6 Although many of the
cases involved messages relating to death or illness of close relatives,
the right to recover was frequently recognized when neither was present. A cause of action was upheld under any circumstances that put the
company on notice, either from the character or content of the message
or from knowledge it possessed or had conveyed to it at the time of
and reasonably result
sending, that mental suffering would naturally
10 7
from its negligence in handling the message.
In several cases the court held that a claimant, in order to recover,
had to establish a "high degree of-mental suffering" and that proof of
mere annoyance, disappointment or regret was insufficient to establish
a cause of action.' 0 8 Despite this limitation, the existence of a close
family relationship was held to create a presumption of mental suffering sufficient to permit the jury to award damages.' 0 9 Similarly, proof
of a close relationship, other than a familial one, was regarded as an
important factor in establishing the requisite degree of mental suffering.110 The cases clearly suggest that any genuine mental suffering is
compensable and that the denial of recovery for annoyance, disappointment and regret does not indicate any broader limitation than a
literal interpretation of those words suggests.
The rationale used by the supreme court in allowing recovery in
the cases has varied. Some cases seem simply to apply usual negligence
concepts without evidencing any concern that the claim for mental suffering without physical injury requires exceptional treatment."' Other
cases justify the award of damages in a more limited way. The company's negligence has been held to be a breach of a public duty undertaken by the company in consideration of the grant of its charter, and
104. E.g., Kivett v. Western Union Tel. Co., 156 N.C. 296, 72 S.E. 388 (1911); Gerock v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 147 N.C. 1, 60 S.E. 637 (1908).
105. E.g., Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943); Dayvis v.

Western Union Tel. Co., 139 N.C. 79, 51 S.E. 898 (1905).
106. See Holler v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 N.C. 336, 63 S.E. 92 (1908); Laudie v. Western
Union Tel Co., 124 N.C. 528, 32 S.E. 886 (1899); Cashion v. Western Union Tel. Co.; 124 N.C.
459, 32 S.E. 746 (1899).
107. Green v. Western Union Tel. Co., 136 N.C. 489, 49 S.E. 165 (1904).
108. Kivett v. Western Union TeL Co., 156 N.C. 296,72 S.E. 388 (1911); Harrison v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 143 N.C. 147, 55 S.E. 435 (1906); Hancock v. Western Union Tel. Co., 137 N.C.
498, 49 S.E. 952 (1905).
109. Gibbs v. Western Union Tel. Co., 196 N.C. 516, 146 S.E. 209 (1929).
110. Hunter v. Western Union Tel. Co., 135 N.C. 458, 47 S.E. 745 (1904); Bright v. Western
Union TeL Co., 132 N.C. 317, 43 S.E. 841 (1903).
111. See cases cited note 103 supra.
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recognition of this special duty seems to have been an important factor
in the court's decision."I A variation of this idea has appeared in other
cases in which the court viewed the cause of action as a necessary incentive, which otherwise would be missing, to the company to carry out
its responsibility to the public. 1 3 This general line of reasoning would
probably prevail today, and the authority of the cases may, therefore,
be limited by it.
Similar reasoning has been used to uphold a cause of action for
the negligent or intentional conduct of a carrier in wrongfully ejecting
or discharging a passenger,11 4 carrying him beyond his destination," 5
failing to stop at a flag station," 6 and using rude and insulting language to a passenger.11 7 In these actions recovery has been allowed for
annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, humiliation, wounded feeling,
and mental suffering and pain."' The same rationale has also been
relied upon in awarding damages for annoyance, inconvenience, humiliation and mental suffering incident to wrongful termination of telephone services.1 19
B. Mishandling of DeadBodies
A right to recover for mental or emotional harm caused by negligent or intentional mutilation or mishandling of dead bodies has been
recognized. Running over the body with a train, 20 performing an unauthorized autopsy' 2 ' and withholding the body to induce payment of
embalming fees 2 have all been held sufficient to give rise to the cause
112. Bryan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N.C. 603, 45 S.E. 938 (1903); Cashion v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 124 N.C. 459, 32 S.E. 746 (1899).
113. Penn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 159 N.C. 306, 75 S.E. 16 (1912); Cashion v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 123 N.C. 267, 31 S.E. 493 (1898); Sherrill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 116 N.C.
655, 21 S.E. 429 (1895).
114. Hallman v. Southern Ry., 169 N.C. 127, 85 S.E. 298 (1915); Harvey v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 153 N.C. 567, 69 S.E. 627 (1910); Mace v. Southern Ry., 151 N.C. 404, 66 S.E. 342
(1909).
115. Hutchinson v. Southern Ry., 140 N.C. 123, 52 S.E. 263 (1905).
116. Williams v. Carolina & N.W.R.R., 144 N.C. 498, 57 S.E. 216 (1907).
117. Hutchinson v. Southern Ry., 140 N.C. 123, 52 S.E. 263 (1905).
118. McNairy v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 172 N.C. 505, 90 S.E. 497 (1916); Sawyer v. Norfolk
S.R.R., 171 N.C. 13, 86 S.E. 166 (1915); Edwards v. Southern Ry., 162 N.C. 278, 78 S.E. 219
(1913).
119. Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 162 N.C. 333, 78 S.E. 507 (1913); Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 17, 72 S.E. 619 (1911).
120. Morrow v. Southern Ry., 213 N.C. 127, 195 S.E. 383 (1938); Kyles v. Southern Ry., 147
N.C. 394, 61 S.E. 278 (1908).
121. Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613, 197 S.E. 163 (1938); Stephenson v. Duke Univ.,
202 N.C. 624, 163 S.E. 698 (1932).
122. Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral Home, 206 N.C. 652, 175 S.E. 137 (1934).
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of action. On the other hand, mishandling 'or multilation is not established by proof of an unauthorized embalming performed by the defendant after the body has been delivered to defendant's funeral

home. 123
Recovery for mutilation or mishandling of dead bodies, however,
has been limited by the rationale that the cause of action is based on a
quasi-property right in the body:
Our law recognizes that the next of kin has a quasi-property
right in the body-not property in the commercial sense but a right
of possession for the purpose of burial-and that there arises out of
this relationship to the body an emotional interest which should be
which others have a duty not to injure intentionally or
protected and
1 24
negligently.
Although the artificiality of this rationale was exposed in a dissenting
opinion in an early case,12 1 the court has probably deliberately adhered
mental suffering to a single class of claimto it to limit recovery from
12 6
ants-the next of kin.
Under this theory recovery is allowed for mental or emotional
harm alone, and proof of a resulting physical injury is not required. 27
The cases in which it has been used have all involved situations in
which, although adverse feelings or emotions were caused, no serious
mental or emotional injury ensued. The possibility exists that a claimant other than the next of kin might recover under other lines of authority recognizing a cause of action when physical injury is caused. Of
course, this possibility would be foreclosed if the court took the position that the mutilation theory was the exclusive method of recovery in
this type of case.
C. Direct PhysicalInjury
When a physical injury is caused directly by the defendant's negligence, mental suffering that accompanies or is caused by the physical
injury is a proper element of damage.128 Generally, recovery has been
123. Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 262 N.C. 560, 138 S.E.2d 214 (1964).
124. Id. at 561, 138 S.E.2d at 215-16.
125. Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 167 N.C. 55, 62, 83 S.E. 12, 15 (1914) (Clark, CJ.,

dissenting).
126. Stephenson v. Duke Univ., 202 N.C. 624, 163 S.E. 698 (1932); Floyd v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry., 167 N.C. 55, 83 S.E. 12 (1914).
127. Kyles v. Southern Ry., 147 N.C. 394, 61 S.E. 278 (1908).
128. E.g., King v. Higgins, 272 N.C. 267, 158 S.E.2d 67 (1967); Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound
Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 38 S.E.2d 105 (1946); Britt v. Carolina N.R.R, 148 N.C. 37, 61 S.E. 601

(1908).
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permitted for any suffering of body and mind, 129 and the defendant has
been held liable for a wide range of adverse consequences, including
embarrassment,130 humiliation,13' pain, 132 mental anguish,133 depres3 5 and traumatic neurosis.13 6
sive reaction, 34 traumatic neurasthenia
An obvious element of damage is mental and emotional harm, including pain and suffering, related directly to the physical injury, and
recovery is readily allowed for such harm. 131 Recovery has not been
limited to this type of damage, however. The wrongdoer has been held
liable for fright or other mental distress produced by the occurrence
that caused the physical injury. 138 Liability has been imposed for
mental and emotional harm that, although not caused directly by the
physical injury, results from circumstances that are brought into existence by such injury. Thus, recovery has been allowed for mental distress incident to a permanent scar left by the injury 13 9 and for pain and
suffering experienced in skin-grafting operations performed in treatment of the injury. 4 ° Even when a plaintiffs harm is less directly connected to the physical injury and results from his response to difficulties
he must confront because of it, recovery may be allowed. 14 1 Liability
has been imposed for amnesia and depression that were caused in part
by the mental stress, financial worries and strain plaintiff experienced
due to his incapacity to work because of physical injuries he had received in an accident three months earlier.142 That a preexisting condito such harm is immaterial when
tion enhances plaintiffs susceptibility
143
direct physical injury is present.
129. Ledford v. Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 614, 112 S.E. 421 (1927); Hargis v. Knoxville Power Co., 175 N.C. 31, 94 S.E. 702 (1917).
130. Parker v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 181 N.C. 95, 106 S.E. 755 (1921).
131. Id.
132. Conrad v. Shuford, 174 N.C. 719, 94 S.E. 424 (1917).
133. Muse v. Ford Motor Co., 175 N.C. 466, 95 S.E. 900 (1918).
134. Inman v. Harper, 2 N.C. App. 103, 162 S.E.2d 629 (1968).
135. Brown v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 147 N.C. 136, 60 S.E. 898 (1908).
136. Ford v. Blythe Bros. Co., 242 N.C. 347, 87 S.E.2d 879 (1955).
137. See cases cited notes 128-136 sufpra.
138. See cases cited note 146 infra (consequential physical injury involved).
139. Robertson v. Stanley, 285 N.C. 561, 206 S.E.2d 190 (1974); King v. Britt, 267 N.C. 594,
148 S.E.2d 594 (1966).
140. Lane v. Southern Ry., 192 N.C. 287, 134 S.E. 855 (1926).

141. Kistler v. Southern Ry., 171 N.C. 577, 88 S.E. 864 (1916) (distress and humiliation from
jaundice attack caused by injury); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundary Co., 159 N.C. 327, 74 S.E.
885 (1912) (mental suffering created by likelihood cancer would develop); Britt v. Carolina N.
RR., 148 N.C. 37, 39, 61 S.E. 601, 603 (1908) ("knew he could never be well again, and it almost
broke his heart ... that he would be a cripple for life").
142. Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
143. Id.
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ConsequentialPhysical Injury

Recovery in North Carolina has not been limited to cases in which
contemporaneous physical injury occurs. Liability has also been found
when a defendant's negligence produces fright, anger or other emotional disturbance that in turn causes physical injury. The question
whether a cause of action should be recognized under these circumstances came squarely before the court in an early case, Watkins v. Kaolin Manufacturing Co.'" The court, in sustaining a cause of action,
said:
[W]e are of the opinion that an action will lie for physical injury or
disease resulting from fright or nervous shocks caused by negligent
acts; from common experience we know that serious consequences
frequently follow violent nervous shocks caused by fright, often resulting in spells of sickness, and sometimes in sudden death.'
The right to recover for mental or emotional disturbance and resulting
46
physical injury has been recognized in a number of later cases.1
No distinct line can be drawn to separate physical injury from
mental and emotional harm. The phrase "pain and suffering" probably
derives from the difficulty of making any meaningful division of injuries into such categories. In Hargisv. Knoxville Power Co., 4 7 the court,
in rejecting defendant's argument that recovery for mental suffering
should be denied because the complaint did not "set up 'mental
anguish' as an element of damage as distinct from physical suffering,"
observed: "As all pain is mental and centers in the brain, . . . the injured party is allowed to recover for actual suffering of mind and body
... "14s An equally sensible approach has been taken by the
supreme court in applying the rule that consequential physical injury
must be present to warrant recovery when mental or emotional harm
has been caused. The cases in no way suggest any attempt to establish
an inflexible and arbitrary division of injuries into physical and mental
harm.
Physical injury, as incorporated in the rule, is not used in the sense
of an injury to a specific part of the body, such as a cut, broken bones,
144. 131 N.C. 536, 42 S.E. 983 (1902).

145. Id. at 541-42, 42 S.E. at 985.
146. Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967); Sparks v. Tennessee
Mineral Prods. Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 193 S.E. 31 (1937); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210
N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936); Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438,73 S.E. 211 (1911); May v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416, 72 S.E. 1059 (1911); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 66 S.E.

778 (1906).
147. 175 N.C. 31, 94 S.E. 702 (1917).
148. Id. at 34, 94 S.E. at 703.
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or damage to an internal organ. 149 This view is effectively set forth in

May v. Western Union Telegraph Co 150:
[Tihe general principles of the law of torts support a right of action
for physical injuries resulting from either a willful or a negligent act,
none the less strongly because the physical injury consists of a
wrecked nervous system instead of wounded or lacerated limbs, as
those of the former class are frequently much more painful and enduring than those of the latter.'
Impairment of health, loss of bodily power, or sickness, without
proof of any specific injury, has been held to constitute a physical injury.152 Similarly, proof that plaintiff became "almost helpless; that she
could not go about her daily duties, and could not keep on her feet to
attend to her children; that it has affected her ever since, and has
caused her female trouble out of its regular course" has been held a
sufficient showing of physical injury. 5 3 A jury instruction permitting
recovery if plaintiff was "put in fear and frightened to such an extent
that she suffered physical pain, suffered in body and mind, and was
made sick" was held proper.'5 4 In many of these cases, expert medical
testimony was not introduced to establish that the emotional distress
could or did operate to cause physical consequences, and proof of the
physical injury was through plaintiffs own testimony, much of which
seems to have been couched in general language such as "sickness."
Under these holdings it is probable that a "physical" injury can be
shown in any case in which significant mental or emotional harm has
occurred. Indeed, a reasonable interpretation of the cases would be
that the physical injury requirement is simply a vehicle used by the
court to distinguish harm of this magnitude from less serious interferences, which, if a multitude of suits are to be avoided, everyone must be
left to absorb to some degree. In a recent case, the court, relying upon
the broad interpretation of physical injury in earlier cases, held that an
allegation that the plaintiff "suffered great mental anguish and anxiety
is sufficient. . . to go to trial upon the question of whether the great
mental anguish and anxiety. . .[caused] physical injury."' 55
It is unclear whether a defendant's conduct, in order to provide a
149. Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967).
150. 157 N.C. 416, 72 S.E. 1059 (1911).
151. Id. at 422, 72 S.E. at 1061.
152. Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Prods. Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 193 S.E. 31 (1937); Kimberly v.
Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906).
153. Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 536, 538, 42 S.E. 983, 984 (1902).
154. Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 439, 73 S.E. 211, 212 (1911).
155. Stanback v. Stanbank. 297 N.C. 181, 199, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623 (1979).
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basis for imposition of liability, must create a forespeable risk of mental
or emotional harm of a type likely to cause physical injury. Many of
the cases involved fact situations in which unreasonable risks of both
emotional distress and resulting physical injury were foreseeable. In
the initial case allowing recovery, the supreme court appeared to regard
the foreseeability of both risks to be essential' 56 ; but a recent case deals
with the risk concept in terms of theforeseeability of "consequences of
a generally injurious nature" 157-- the standard usually applied in negligence cases. The latter case, however, involved-harassment by a bill
collector and emotional harm was the principal risk his conduct
threatened.
The Restatement (Second)of Torts bases this cause of action solely

upon the interest in physical security. 58 It recognizes that negligent
conduct may threaten physical injury directly or through the operation
of emotional disturbance. When conduct risks direct physical injury
but causes only emotional distress and consequential physical injury,
liability is imposed although neither the distress nor resulting injury is
foreseeable.' 59 If only mental or emotional harm is threatened by the
conduct, a distinction is made between conduct that is intended to
cause emotional distress and conduct that, while not intended to cause
it, involves an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress. When
the conduct is not intended to cause emotional distress, both the distress and the resulting injury must be reasonably foreseeable before liability attaches. 60 The foreseeability requirement is not as rigorous
when the
defendant acts for the purpose of causing emotional dis16 1
tress.
The rule structure set out in the Restatement is substantially more
elaborate than that which has evolved in the North Carolina cases.
The results in the cases in which a defendant has intended to cause
62
emotional distress seem consistent with the Restatement position.'
No specific distinction has been made in them, however, between
threatened physical injury and threatened emotional disturbance. Although it is unclear whether specific foreseeability of emotional harm is
necessary to establish liability when a defendant's conduct involves un156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 536, 42 S.E. 983 (1902).
Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684, 689, 157 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1967).
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 212, Comment a (1965).
Id. § 436, Comment d.
Id. § 313.
Id. § 312, Comments d, e.
See text accompanying notes 164-179 infra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

reasonable risks of other harm, the cases seem to support the view that
it is not and that unreasonable risks of any type of injury coupled with
significant emotional distress is enough.
The risk of direct physical harm may arise from fright or other
emotional disturbance created by a defendant's conduct. Thus, when a
person is subjected to fright through the perpetration of a practical
joke, it may be foreseeable that his response will entail the risk of physical injury to himself or third persons from external circumstances
rather than through internal operation of the fright. Although this type
of case has been grouped by the court with the cases discussed in this
section,1 63 a preferrable analysis would be to recognize that liability
exists because direct physical injury was risked and in fact caused by
the defendant's conduct. Under this analysis, the third person in the
above illustration, who may not have been subjected to any fright,
would have a cause of action.
V.

INTENTIONAL TORT

That mental or emotional harm has been caused by intentional
conduct does not necessarily mean that an intentional tort theory will
be either relied upon or available for recovery. Risks of emotional distress are more likely to be foreseeable to a defendant who acts intentionally for the purpose of affecting a plaintiff than to one who is only
negligent toward him. When foreseeable risks of emotional distrubance arise from a defendant's intentional conduct, a cause of action
in negligence may be maintained if emotional distress and consequential physical injury in fact result. Indeed, a number of the North Carolina negligence cases in this area involve situations in which a
defendant acted intentionally.1' 4
Earlier discussion indicated that the supreme court has recognized
mental and emotional security as a primary interest intended to be protected by some intentional torts1 65 and that recovery for mental and
emotional harm caused by these and perhaps other intentional torts
may be allowed under the parasitic damages rule. 166 Intentional tort,
as a separate basis of liability, seems to have been utilized only in a
163. See, ag., Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965); Langford v. Shu,
258 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962).
164. Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967); Langford v. Shu, 258
N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625
(1936).
165. See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
166. See discussion in part II. of this Article supra.

1980]

RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH

group of cases in which the theory of forcible trespass was relied upon
by the court in finding liability.167 Because of the uniqueness of the
forcible trespass theory, any conclusion about the broader significance
of this line of cases must be an uncertain one. Kirby v. Jules Chain
Stores Corp.,"6 8 a case involving highly abusive conduct by a bill collector, could also be placed in this category, but has been cited in later
cases as authority to support recovery in negligence. As consequential
physical injury apparently was present in these cases, whether the basis
of liability was negligence or intentional tort would seem to be unimportant as a practical matter.
A recent North Carolina case, Stanback v. Stanback,169 found the
allegations in a complaint sufficient "to state a claim for what has become essentially the tort of intentional infliction of serious emotional
distress."'' 0 Because of the unusual context in which the decision was
made, an opportunity to develop the full dimensions of the tort was not
presented, and as a result a number of serious questions were left unanswered by the decision. Plaintiff sought to recover damages for mental
anguish and punitive damages for an alleged breach of a separation
agreement. The court held that neither could be recovered in an action
for breach of contract but upheld recovery of them on the ground that
the conduct alleged to show a breach of contract constituted the tort of
intentional infliction of serious mental distress.
A large number of states have adopted the tort of intentional infliction of mental anguish17 ' and generally, in doing so, have followed
the model set out in the Restatement (Second)of Torts.172 The Restate-

ment model affords protection only against severe emotional distress
intentionally or recklessly caused by extreme and outrageous conduct.
This interest in mental and emotional security in itself is regarded as
sufficiently important to warrant protection through tort action and
neither physical injury to nor invasion of other interests of the claimant
need be shown to establish a cause of action.
Questions about the North Carolina decision in Stanback arise
primarily because of the court's characterization of the cause of action
as the "tort of intentional infliction of serious emotional distress." Did
167. For discussion of the forcible trespass cases, see text accompanying notes 31-47 supra.
168. 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936). For discussion of this case, see text accompanying

notes 37-45 supra.
169. 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
170. Id. at 196, 254 S.E.2d at 621-22.
171. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 49-62.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORiTS § 46 (1965).
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the court intend by this characterization to incorporate into the cause of
action the elements that are now generally associated with it in other
jurisdictions? Prior cases uphold the right to recover for mental or
emotional disturbance and resulting physical injury caused by a defendant's intentional conduct on a negligence theory' 7 3 and probably
an intentional tort theory. 174 Although the earlier decisions may implicitly suggest that hurt feelings, embarrassment, regret, annoyance
and other interferences "against which ordinary firmness is a sufficient
protection" are insufficient to permit recovery175 and that, therefore,
the interference must be a significant one, it is doubtful that they can be
read to require severe mental or emotional disturbance as a prerequisite to recovery.1 76 Further, these cases, some of which were relied
upon by the court in Stanback, cannot reasonably be interpreted to
limit recovery for emotional distress and consequential physical injury
either to situations in which the defendant's conduct has been extreme
and outrageous 177 or to those in which severe mental distress has been
intentionally or recklessly caused.' 78 Recovery in negligence cases has
been based upon conduct involving, at most, the risk of foreseeable
mental anguish and, perhaps, resulting physical injury, and, when the
conduct is intended to1 79cause emotional distress, even these requirements may be relaxed.
Another problem raised by Stanback is the holding that resulting
physical injury is essential to the cause of action.'8 0 An important feature of the tort of intentional infliction of mental anguish under the
Restatement model is that it affords protection against severe mental
anguish independently of physical injury or invasion of other interests. "' The stringent requirements for the cause of action serve, to a
substantial degree, to guarantee the genuineness of the claim and to
eliminate trivial claims and thus to remove the need for a requirement
173. See cases discussed in subparts IV. A. and B. of this Article supra.
174. See notes 165-67 and accompanying text supra.

175. Kaylor v. Sain, 207 N.C. 312, 313, 176 S.E. 560, 561 (1934).
176. See notes 108-110, 127, 137-41, 152-55 and accompanying text supra. See also Anthony
v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934); Alltop v. J.C. Penney Co., 10 N.C.
App. 692, 179 S.E.2d 885, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 348, 182 S.E.2d 581 (1971).
177. See notes 144-157, 163 and accompanying text supra.
178. Id.
179. See text accompanying notes 161-62 sufpra.
180. 297 N.C. 181, 198-99, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623 (1979).
181. "[Intentional infliction of emotional distress] is not, however, limited to cases where there

has been bodily harm; and if the conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous there may be
liability for emotional distress alone, without such harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 46, Comment k.
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of contemporaneous or consequential physical injury for this purpose.

1 82

Although the court, in recognizing the tort of intentional infliction
of severe emotional distress, may have intended to enlarge the right to
recover for mental and emotional harm, the danger exists that the case
will be interpreted to have the opposite effect. The Stanback court
seems correct in finding a cause of action, and much of the difficulty in
interpreting the decision arises from the name the court chose to describe that cause of action. In this context, it may be significant that the
court, in considering the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to state a cause of action in tort, did not relate them to possible
findings of extreme and outrageous conduct or of intent to cause severe
mental distress and recklessness. Adoption of the tort of intentional
infliction of severe mental distress in North Carolina makes little sense,
either in theory or, even more importantly, in light of earlier case law
development, ff a requirement of consequential physical injury is imposed. Although the Stanback court, following North Carolina's liberal view of what constitutes a physical injury, practically conceded the
existence of one, imposing the technical requirement of a physical injury may be a source of confusion. The implication may well be that,
even when a physical injury results, a cause of action will exist only if
the other stringent requirements of the tort of intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress are present.
VI.

A.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

Thin Skull Rule

In Lockwood v. McCaskill,183 plaintiff received physical injuries in
an automobile accident caused by defendant's negligence and later, because of worry about the injury, developed amnesia. Had it not been
for a preexisting condition that made plaintiff susceptible to mental
harm, the amnesia would not have developed. The court applied the
thin skull rule to hold defendant liable.
The general rule is that if defendant's act would not have resulted in
any injury to an ordinary person, he is not liable for its harmful consequences to one of peculiar susceptibility, except insofar as he was
on notice of the existence of such susceptibility, but if his misconduct
amounted to a breach of duty to a person of ordinary susceptibility,
he is liable for all damages suffered by the plaintiff notwithstanding
182. Id.
183. 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
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were unusually extensive because of pethe fact that these damages
84
culiar susceptibility.'
In other cases, the imposition of liability, upon the facts involved in
them, suggests application of the rule, although the issue was not
squarely presented.' 85
The suggestion has been made' 86 that an earlier case, Williamson v.
Bennett, 87 may limit, in some uncertain way, the application of the
thin skull rule to mental harm. In Williamson, defendant negligently
caused an automobile accident in which plaintiff suffered no physical
injuries. In a prior incident, a car driven by plaintiff's brother-in-law
had struck and killed a girl on a bicycle. Plaintiff had a preexisting
disposition to neurosis. Because of plaintiff's preexisting condition and
the earlier incident, the grinding sound of the collision caused her to
believe that she had struck a child on a bicycle and precipitated in her a
neurotic reaction. Plaintiff sought to recover for harm related to that
reaction.
The court, in a complex decision, essentially held that the harm
was too remote to be compensable. 8 8 Despite the unusual combination of circumstances that caused the neurosis, the thin skull rule could
have been applied to hold defendant liable. Both the reaction and the
imagined stimulus that prompted it were centered in plaintiff's preexisting condition and defendant's conduct precipiated both. Nevertheless,
even if the court had determined that the thin skull rule did apply, a
decision to deny liability would not have been unreasonable. Because
the court did not directly consider application of the thin skull rule and
because of the unique circumstances involved, it is doubtful that the
case should be regarded as effecting any significant limitation upon the
Lockwood case.
In Lockwood, contemporaneous physical injury was caused by defendant's conduct. There is no apparent reason why the thin skull rule
should not apply when the cause of action is based upon emotional
distress that results in physical injury and a plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility is important only to the determination of a defendant's liability
for additional harm that is caused by it. The application of the rule is
less clear, however, when the initial emotional distress or the resulting
184. Id. at 670, 138 S.E.2d at 546.
185. See Ford v. Blythe Bros. Co., 242 N.C. 347, 87 S.E.2d 879 (1955); Brown v. Seaboard Air

Line Ry., 147 N.C. 136, 60 S.E. 898 (1908).
186. Byrd & Dobbs, Survey of North CarolinaCase Law, Torts, 43 N.C.L. Rav. 906, 924-25
(1965).
187. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
188. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
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physical injury occurs only because of a plaintiffs susceptibility. If a
defendant knows of a plaintiffs susceptibility, the defendant should not
be relieved of liability merely because the distress or injury would not
have occurred without the plaintiffs peculiar susceptibility. Except for
Williamson, no North Carolina case has involved the situation in
which a defendant is unaware of a plaintiffs susceptibility, and a projection of the position the supreme court might take in this situation is
difficult.
Although the traditional view rejects application of the thin skull
rule in the determination of negligence and applies it instead to the
determination of the extent of liability, i" 9 these issues are not as readily
separable in mental anguish cases as in typical neligence cases. The
following example illustrates the problem. Defendant's conduct creates
an unreasonable risk of direct physical injury to plaintiff that is not
realized; instead fright and consequential physical injury are caused.
Should liability be imposed when plaintiffs physical injury was caused
by his susceptibility and none would have occurred to a normal person?
The Restatement provides for liability in this situation. 190 The same
question arises when defendant intentionally causes emotional distress
and physical injury results because of plaintiffs peculiar susceptibility.
The Restatement again provides for liability if the susceptibility is one
that is common to any appreciable minority of persons.' 9'
B. Fearfor a Third Person'sSafety
The North Carolina Supreme Court, consistent with decisions in
other jurisdictions, has indicated that mental anguish caused by fear for
the safety or well-being of a third person is not compensable.192 In
several of the cases the claimant suffered mental anguish -because of
concern for and worry about a close relative who had been injured by
defendant's negligence. 93 The claimant was not present when the accident occurred, and his own safety was in no way threatened by defendant's negligence. The traditional rule, which is still followed by a
189. See text accompanying note 184 supra.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436, Comment d, at 458-59 (1965) (liability exists
although fright not a probable result of negligence and physical injury not a probable result of the
fright).
191. Id. § 312, Comment d, at 111-12. When fright is unintentionally caused, however, liability exists only if physical injury would result to a normal person. Id. § 313, Comment c, at 113-14.
192. Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960); Ferebee v. Norfolk So. R.R.,
163 N.C. 351, 79 S.E. 685 (1913).
193. Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1944); Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n v. Neal, 194 N.C. 401, 139 S.E. 841 (1927); Hinnant v. Tidewater Power
Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); Croom v. Murphy, 179 N.C. 393, 102 S.E. 706 (1920).
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majority of courts, requires that the claimant be in the zone of danger
created by defendant's negligence before he may recover. 194 In some
jurisdictions a more liberal rule allowing recovery for foreseeable
mental anguish arising out of fear for a third person's safety has replaced the "zone of danger" rule. 195 Even under this more liberal rule,
however, the claimant's presence at the scene and contemporaneous
96
observation of danger to a close relative are essential to recovery.'
The unusual facts in Williamson v. Bennett, 97 involving a neurotic
response to "a non-existent child on an imaginary bicyle," were set out
earlier.198 One of the reasons given by the court to deny liability was
that plaintiffs fear was for the safety of a third person. The court said:
Also, it is indisputable that plaintiffs fright and anxiety was for the
safety of the imaginary non-existent child and not because of any
apprehension for her own safety or well-being. The record does not
disclose any evidence that plaintiff feared that she would suffer any
harm of any kind from the collision. She thought of herself as one
who might have injured another and this was only momentary. She
learned immediately that her fears were ungrounded. As already inthere can be no recovery for the
dicated, this Court has held that199
safety and well-being of another.

Projection of the Williamson case beyond its own peculiar facts is
difficult. Although the decision to deny liability may be a correct one,
the appropriateness of this particular rationale for the decision is less
clear. To couch the issue in terms of fear for a third person's safety
suggests a more clear-cut issue than in fact exists. As noted earlier,
both the reaction and the imagined stimulus that prompted it were centered in plaintiffs preexisting condition and defendant's conduct precipitated both. The crucial issue is whether, despite this fact, the injury
appears sufficiently tenuous to relieve defendant of liability.
2 ° has been
One other case, Ferebee v. Norfolk Southern Railroad,
cited to support the view that no recovery can be had in North Carolina
for mental anguish arising out of fear for another's safety. The court
denied recovery for mental suffering caused by plaintiffs worry that his
physical injuries would prevent him from supporting his family and
educating his children. This decision seems debatable. When plain194. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 333-35.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
251 N.C. at 508, 112 S.E.2d at 55.
163 N.C. 351, 79 S.E. 685 (1913).
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tiffs injury is permanent, a limitation upon defendant's liability for
continuing mental anguish for an extended period of time because of
his inability to provide for his family may be reasonable. Justification
for denial of recovery for such mental anguish suffered as an immediate consequence of the accident and its aftermath, however, is difficult
to find.2 °
The typical situation in which a defendant's negligence endangers
a third person and a plaintiffs mental anguish arises out of his fear for
that person's safety has not been presented to the court. Most of the
cases denying recovery because a plaintiffs anguish was related to the
safety of a third peson and not his own involved facts under which
other courts would have found no liability. Yet, many of these same
courts uphold recovery when a close relative of a plaintiff is placed in
danger by a defendant's negligence and, depending upon the jurisdiction, the plaintiff is either present or endangered. The earlier North
Carolina cases, placed in proper perspective, should therefore be
viewed as leaving open the question whether recovery will be allowed
under these circumstances.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Over a long period of time the North Carolina decisions have generally been liberal in allowing recovery for mental and emotional harm
in a negligence action. The supreme court never adopted the view,
which prevailed until fairly recently in many jurisdictions, that a contemporaneous physical injury or an impact upon the person is necessary to recovery for mental or emotional harm. The rule allowing
recovery for mental disturbance when physical injury results was recognized by the court at an early date, and the court, in applying this
rule, has given a broad meaning to physical injury. The suggestion that
recovery may be allowed in any case in which significant and genuine
mental or emotional harm is caused is reasonable in view of this broad
definition. Even though the court has never stated the rule in this way,
it is clear that the decisions go far in this direction and that, if they are
to be followed, any other position would be difficult to justify. Further,
this result is consistent with an apparent concern of the court that annoyance, inconvenience, humiliation and other temporary emotional
disturbances, although they may become an element of damage in a
201. See Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964) (worry and sense of
insecurity); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundary Co., 159 N.C. 327, 74 S.E. 885 (1912) (apprehension of cancer); Britt v. Carolina N.R.R., 148 N.C. 37, 61 S.E. 601 (1908) (worry that he would
never get well and would be a cripple for life).
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separate cause of action, should not in themselves give rise to a tort
action.
Apparently, recovery for mental and emotional harm would be allowed under an intentional tort theory when contemporaneous or.consequential physical injury occurs, just as it is upheld under a negligence
theory. Little direct consideration of the intentional tort theory has
been made in the decisions. Assessment of the few cases in which a
plaintiff's suit was based in intentional tort is difficult because of the
court's reliance upon "forcible trespass" in finding a cause of action.
Nevertheless, the court, in recognizing the right to recover, frequently
states the rule broadly in terms of negligent or intentional conduct, and
little doubt exists that no more stringent requirements will be imposed
under intentional tort than apply under negligence.
When mental or emotional harm is recognized as a primary interest protected by the tort action or when a separate cause of action exists
and recovery for emotional distress is allowed under the parasitic damages rule, damages for mental and emotional harm, including annoyance, inconvenience, humiliation and similar harm, as well as serious
mental anguish, are readily allowed. Of course, a defendant's liability
in these instances, as in any other tort action, will be limited to harm
that is proximately caused by his conduct.
This broad study of all the cases in this area reveals a rather extensive and relatively consistent development in the law in North Carolina. Often, this development seems to be overlooked, and as a result a
tendency exists to view cases involving mental anguish claims on an ad
hoc basis, an approach that the court itself suggested in the Williamson
case. Apart from the general unsatisfactory nature of this approach in
deciding important legal issues, it involves a real danger that the sensible and sound development in the law that has occurred will unintentionally be undermined in later decisions, and the uncertainties that
arise out of the Stanback case illustrate this danger.

